Skepticism and Replies
- Dorato, M. (2006). The Irrelevance of the Presenstist/Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 93-109
- Meyer, U. (2005). The Presentist’s Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 112: 213-225
- Savitt, S. (2006). Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 111-127
- Savitt, S. (2009). The Transient Nows. In C. W. Myrvold, J. Christian (eds.) Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and Closing the Epistemic Circle. Amsterdam, Springer, 339-352
- Sider, T. (2001). Four-dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Sider, T. (2006). Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology. Mind 115: 75-97
Special Relativity
- Arthur, R. (2006). Minkowski Spacetime and the Dimenson of the Present. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 129-155
- Balashov, Y. V., Janssen, M. (2003). Presentism and Relativity, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 327-346
- Belnap, N. & Placek, T.(2012). Indeterminism is a Modal Notion: Branching Spacetimes and Earman’s Pruning. Synthese 187(2): 441-469
- Bourne, C. (2006). A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Callender, C. (1998). Shedding Light on Time. Philosophy of Science 67: 587-599
- Clifton, R & Hogarth, M (1995), The definability of objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime, Synthese 103 (3):355 – 387
- Craig, W. I. (2001). Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing
- Dieks, D. (2006). Becoming, Relativity and Locality. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 157-176
- Fine, K. (2006). The Reality of Tense. Synthese 150(3): 399-414
- Godfrey-Smith, W. (1979). Special Relativity and the Present. Philosophical Studies 36: 233-244
- Hinchliff, M. (2000). A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting. Philosophy of Science 67: 575-586
- Pooley, O. (2013) Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(3): 321-363
- Putnam, H. (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64: 240-247
- Rietdijck, C. W. (1966). A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity. Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 341-344
- Saunders, S. (2002). How Relativity Contradicts Presentism. In C. Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 277-292
- Savitt, S. (2000). There’s no Time like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime). Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 563-574
- Skow, B. (2209). Relativity and the Moving Spotlight Theory. Journal of Philosophy 106(12): 666-678
- Stein, H. (1968). On Einstein-Minkowski Spacetime. Journal of Philosophy 65: 5-23
- Stein, H. (1991). On Relativity Theory and the Openness of Future. Philosophy of Science 58: 147-167
- Weingard, R. (1972). Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2): 119-121
- Zimmerman, D. (2011). Presentism and the Spacetime Manifold. In Callender, C. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 163-244
General Relativity
- Belot, G. (2005), Dust, Time and Symmetry, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(2): 255-291
- Bourne, C. (2004), Becoming Inflated, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (1): 107-119
- Gödel, K. (1949). A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy. In A. Schlipp (ed.). Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. New York: Harper and Dowe, 557-562
- Earman, J. (1989). World Enough and Spacetime (Cambridge, MA: MIT).
- Earman, J. (1995). Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Earman, J. (2002). Thoroughly Modern McTaggart: Or What McTaggart Would Have Said if He Had Read General Relativity, Philosopher’s Imprint 2(3): 1-28
- Earman, J., (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. Internation Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22(2): 135-164
- Earman, J., Smeenk, C. Wuthrich, C. (2009), Do the Laws of Physics Forbid the Operation of a Time Machine?, Synthese 169 (1): 91-124
- Healey, R. (2004), Change Without Change and How to Observe it in General Relativity, Synthese 141(3): 381-415
- Lockwood, M. (2005), The Labyrinth of Time, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Maudlin, T. (2002). Thoroughly Muddled McTaggart: Or How to Abuse Gauge Freedom to Create Metaphysical Monstruosities. Philosopher’s Imprint 2(4): 1-23
- Maudlin, T. (2007). The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Savitt, S. (1994). The Replacement of Time, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72(4): 463-474
- Wuthrich, C. (2013). The Fate of Presentism in Modern Physics. In Ciuni, R., Miller, K. Torrengo, G. (eds). New Papers on the Present, Philosophia Verlag: 91-132
- Yourgrau, P. (1999). Gödel Meets Einstein: Time Travel in the Gödel Universe, Chicago, Open Court
Quantum Mechanics
- Albert, D. (2000). Time and Chance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
- Dowe, P. (1997), A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics, Synthese 112 (2): 233-246
- Esfeld, M. (2014). Quantum Humeanism: or Physicalism Without Properties, The Philosophical Quarterly 64: 453-470
- Miller, E. (2013). Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics and Humean Supervenience, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3): 567-583
- Saunders, S. (1995), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Dechoerence, Synthese 102 (2): 235-266
- Saunders, S. (1996), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Tense, Synthese 107 (1): 19-53
- Saunders, S. (1998), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Probability, Synthese 114 (3): 373-404
- Wilson, A. (2012), Everettion Quantum Mechanics without Branching Time, Synthese 188 (1): 67-84
Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics
- Albert, D. (2000) Time and Chance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
- Earman, J. (2006), The Past Hypothesis: Not Even false, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 399-430
- Price, H. (1996), Time’s Arrow and Archimede’s Point, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Quantum Gravity
- Belot, G. Earman, J. (2001), Pre-Socratic Quantum Gravity, In Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Butterfiled, J., Isham C. (1999), On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity, In The Arguments of Time, Oxford University Press
- Callender, C., Huggett, N. (2001) (eds), Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Monton, B. (2006), Presentism and Quantum Gravity, in D. Dieks (ed), The Ontology of Spacetime, Berlin, Springer
- Wuthrich, C. (2001), No Presentism in Quantum Gravity, in V. Petkov (ed) Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time. Berlin, Springer
Persistence and Relativity
- Balashov, Y. (1999). Relativistic Objects. Noûs 33: 644-662
- Balashov, Y. (2008). Persistence and Multilocation in Spacetime. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime (2). Amsterdam, Elsevier: 59-81
- Balashov, Y. (2010). Persistence and Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Balashov, Y. (2014a). On the Invariance and Intrinsicality of Four-dimensional Shapes in Special Relativity. Analysis 74(4): 608-612
- Balashov, Y. (2014b). Relativistic Parts and Places: a Note on Corner Slices and Shrinking Chairs, in C. Calosi, C.& P. Graziani (Eds.), Mereology and the Sciences (pp. 35-51). Berlin, Springer
- Davidson, M. (2014). Special Relativity and the Intrinsicality of Shape. Analysis 74: 57-58
- Gibson, I. and Pooley, O. (2006). Relativistic Persistence. In Philosophical Perspectives 20. Metaphysics: 157-198
- Gilmore, C. (2006). Where in the relativistic World Are We?. In Philosophical Perspectives 23. Metaphysic: 199-236
- Gilmore, C. (2008). Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime. Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1224-1254
- Sattig, T. (2015) The Double Lives of Objects, Oxford, Oxford University Press