Philosophy of Physics References

Skepticism and Replies
  1. Dorato, M. (2006). The Irrelevance of the Presenstist/Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 93-109
  2. Meyer, U. (2005). The Presentist’s Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 112: 213-225
  3. Savitt, S. (2006). Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 111-127
  4. Savitt, S. (2009). The Transient Nows. In C. W. Myrvold, J. Christian (eds.) Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and Closing the Epistemic Circle. Amsterdam, Springer, 339-352
  5. Sider, T. (2001). Four-dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press
  6. Sider, T. (2006). Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology. Mind 115: 75-97
Special Relativity
  1. Arthur, R. (2006). Minkowski Spacetime and the Dimenson of the Present. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 129-155
  2. Balashov, Y. V., Janssen, M. (2003). Presentism and Relativity, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 327-346
  3. Belnap, N. & Placek, T.(2012). Indeterminism is a Modal Notion: Branching Spacetimes and Earman’s Pruning. Synthese 187(2): 441-469
  4. Bourne, C. (2006). A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  5. Callender, C. (1998). Shedding Light on Time. Philosophy of Science 67: 587-599
  6. Clifton, R & Hogarth, M (1995), The definability of objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime, Synthese 103 (3):355 – 387
  7. Craig, W. I. (2001). Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing
  8. Dieks, D. (2006). Becoming, Relativity and Locality. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 157-176
  9. Fine, K. (2006). The Reality of Tense. Synthese 150(3): 399-414
  10. Godfrey-Smith, W. (1979). Special Relativity and the Present. Philosophical Studies 36: 233-244
  11. Hinchliff, M. (2000). A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting. Philosophy of Science 67: 575-586
  12. Pooley, O. (2013) Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(3): 321-363
  13. Putnam, H. (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64: 240-247
  14. Rietdijck, C. W. (1966). A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity. Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 341-344
  15. Saunders, S. (2002). How Relativity Contradicts Presentism. In C. Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 277-292
  16. Savitt, S. (2000). There’s no Time like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime). Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 563-574
  17. Skow, B. (2209). Relativity and the Moving Spotlight Theory. Journal of Philosophy 106(12): 666-678
  18. Stein, H. (1968). On Einstein-Minkowski Spacetime. Journal of Philosophy 65: 5-23
  19. Stein, H. (1991). On Relativity Theory and the Openness of Future. Philosophy of Science 58: 147-167
  20. Weingard, R. (1972). Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2): 119-121
  21. Zimmerman, D. (2011). Presentism and the Spacetime Manifold. In Callender, C. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 163-244
General Relativity
  1. Belot, G. (2005), Dust, Time and Symmetry, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(2): 255-291
  2. Bourne, C. (2004), Becoming Inflated, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (1): 107-119
  3. Gödel, K. (1949). A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy. In A. Schlipp (ed.). Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. New York: Harper and Dowe, 557-562
  4. Earman, J. (1989). World Enough and Spacetime (Cambridge, MA: MIT).
  5. Earman, J. (1995). Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  6. Earman, J. (2002). Thoroughly Modern McTaggart: Or What McTaggart Would Have Said if He Had Read General Relativity, Philosopher’s Imprint 2(3): 1-28
  7. Earman, J., (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. Internation Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22(2): 135-164
  8. Earman, J., Smeenk, C. Wuthrich, C. (2009), Do the Laws of Physics Forbid the Operation of a Time Machine?, Synthese 169 (1): 91-124
  9. Healey, R. (2004), Change Without Change and How to Observe it in General Relativity, Synthese 141(3): 381-415
  10. Lockwood, M. (2005), The Labyrinth of Time, Oxford, Oxford University Press
  11. Maudlin, T. (2002). Thoroughly Muddled McTaggart: Or How to Abuse Gauge Freedom to Create Metaphysical Monstruosities. Philosopher’s Imprint 2(4): 1-23
  12. Maudlin, T. (2007). The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford, Oxford University Press
  13. Savitt, S. (1994). The Replacement of Time, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72(4): 463-474
  14. Wuthrich, C. (2013). The Fate of Presentism in Modern Physics. In Ciuni, R., Miller, K. Torrengo, G. (eds). New Papers on the Present, Philosophia Verlag: 91-132
  15. Yourgrau, P. (1999). Gödel Meets Einstein: Time Travel in the Gödel Universe, Chicago, Open Court
Quantum Mechanics
  1. Albert, D. (2000). Time and Chance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
  2. Dowe, P. (1997), A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics, Synthese 112 (2): 233-246
  3. Esfeld, M. (2014). Quantum Humeanism: or Physicalism Without Properties, The Philosophical Quarterly 64: 453-470
  4. Miller, E. (2013). Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics and Humean Supervenience, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3): 567-583
  5. Saunders, S. (1995), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Dechoerence, Synthese 102 (2): 235-266
  6. Saunders, S. (1996), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Tense, Synthese 107 (1): 19-53
  7. Saunders, S. (1998), Time, Quantum Mechanics and Probability, Synthese 114 (3): 373-404
  8. Wilson, A. (2012), Everettion Quantum Mechanics without Branching Time, Synthese 188 (1): 67-84
Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics
  1. Albert, D. (2000) Time and Chance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
  2. Earman, J. (2006), The Past Hypothesis: Not Even false, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 399-430
  3. Price, H. (1996), Time’s Arrow and Archimede’s Point, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Quantum Gravity
  1. Belot, G. Earman, J. (2001), Pre-Socratic Quantum Gravity, In Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
  2. Butterfiled, J., Isham C. (1999), On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity, In The Arguments of Time, Oxford University Press
  3. Callender, C., Huggett, N. (2001) (eds), Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
  4. Monton, B. (2006), Presentism and Quantum Gravity, in D. Dieks (ed), The Ontology of Spacetime, Berlin, Springer
  5. Wuthrich, C. (2001), No Presentism in Quantum Gravity, in V. Petkov (ed)  Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time. Berlin, Springer
Persistence and Relativity
  1. Balashov, Y. (1999). Relativistic Objects. Noûs 33: 644-662
  2. Balashov, Y. (2008). Persistence and Multilocation in Spacetime. In D. Dieks (ed.). The Ontology of Spacetime (2). Amsterdam, Elsevier: 59-81
  3. Balashov, Y. (2010). Persistence and Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  4. Balashov, Y. (2014a). On the Invariance and Intrinsicality of Four-dimensional Shapes in Special Relativity. Analysis 74(4): 608-612
  5. Balashov, Y. (2014b). Relativistic Parts and Places: a Note on Corner Slices and Shrinking Chairs, in C. Calosi, C.& P. Graziani (Eds.), Mereology and the Sciences (pp. 35-51). Berlin, Springer
  6. Davidson, M. (2014). Special Relativity and the Intrinsicality of Shape. Analysis 74: 57-58
  7. Gibson, I. and Pooley, O. (2006). Relativistic Persistence. In Philosophical Perspectives 20. Metaphysics: 157-198
  8. Gilmore, C. (2006). Where in the relativistic World Are We?. In Philosophical Perspectives 23. Metaphysic: 199-236
  9. Gilmore, C. (2008). Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime. Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1224-1254
  10. Sattig, T. (2015) The Double Lives of Objects, Oxford, Oxford University Press
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