References

Philosophy of Physics References on TimeTime in Literature

Below is the general, starting bibliography for our project.

  • Balashov, Y. (2000): “Persistence and Space-time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn”, The Monist, 83(3), pp. 321-240.
  • Bigelow, John (1996): “Presentism and Properties”, in: Tomberlin, 1996, pp. 35-52.
  • Bourne, C. (2006): A Future for Presentism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Broad, C.D. (1923): Scientific Thought, London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner
  • Cameron, R. (2008): “Turtles all the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality”, The Philosophical Quarterly 58, pp. 1-14.
  • Chisholm, R. M. (1981): “Time and Temporal Demonstratives”, in: K. Weinke, ed., Logik, Ethik und Sprache, Vienna and Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, pp. 31-36.
  • Chisholm, R. M. (1990a): “Events Without Times: An Essay On Ontology” Noûs 24, pp. 413-428.
  • Chisholm, R. M. (1990b): “Referring to Things That No Longer Exist”, in: J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives: Vol. 4 (Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 545-556.
  • Correia, F. (2001a): “Logical Dependence and Independence in the Tractatus”, in R. Haller and K. Puhl (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy. A Reassessment after 50 years, Vol. 1, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  • Correia, F. (2001b): “Dépendance existentielle, fondation et objets composés”, Travaux de logique, 14, 115—128.
  • Correia, F. (2004): “Husserl on Foundation”, Dialectica, 58 (3), 349—367.
  • Correia, F. (2005a): Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, München, Philosophia Verlag.
  • Correia, F. (2005b): “Comments On Achille Varzi’s “Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness””, Dialectica, 59 (4), 499—502.
  • Correia, F. (2005c): “Deux manières de perdurer” in S. Lapointe and F. Lepage (eds.), Langage, Pensée, Action: Actes du Colloque de la SOPHA, Montreal, Nancy: Publications scientifiques Philosophia Scientiae, Vol. 2.
  • Correia, F. (2008): “Ontological Dependence”, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 3.
  • Correia, F. (2010): “Grounding and Truth-Functions”, Logique et Analyse, 2010, 53, pp. 251-79.
  • Correia, F. (2011): “From Grounding to Truth-Making: Some Thoughts”, in A. Reboul, Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan (Online).
  • Correia, F. (2013a): “Presentism and Non-Proxy Reductions of Eternalist Discourse”, in Correia & Iacona 2013.
  • Correia, F. (2013b): “Metaphysical Grounds and Essence”, in M. Hoeltje, B. Schnieder and A. Steinberg (eds.), Varieties of Dependence. Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence, Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, München, Philosophia.
  • Correia, F. (2014): “Logical Grounds”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1), 31-59.
  • Correia, F. (2017): “Dependence”, in H. Burkhardt, J. Seibt & G. Imaguire, Handbook of Mereology, München, Philosophia.
  • Correia, F. (2017): “Supervenience”, in H. Burkhardt, J. Seibt & G. Imaguire, Handbook of Mereology, München, Philosophia.
  • Correia, F. & Iacona, A. (2013): Around the Tree. Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future, Synthese Library, Springer.
  • Correia, F. & Rosenkranz, S. (2011): As Time Goes By: Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe, Paderborn, Mentis.
  • Correia, F. & Rosenkranz, S. (2012): “Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2012, 90 (2), 307-20.
  • Correia, F. & Rosenkranz, S. (2013): “Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 8, 33350.
  • Correia, F. & Schnieder, B. (2012a): Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge University Press.
  • Correia, F. & Schnieder, B. (2012b): “Grounding: an opinionated introduction”, in Correia and Schnieder 2012a.
  • Craig, W. L. (2000): The Tensed Theory of Time, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  • Crisp, Th. (2003): “Presentism”, in: Loux and Zimmerman, 2003, pp. 211-45.
  • Crisp, Th. (2004): “On Presentism and Triviality”, in: Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 15-20
  • Davidson, D. (1970): “Mental Events”, in Foster,Lawrence and Swanson, J.W.,editors, Experience and Theory.
  • Earman, J. S. (2002): “Thoroughly modern McTaggart. Or what McTaggart would have said if he had learned general relativity theory,” Philosophers’ Imprint 2.
  • Esfeld, M. (2004): “Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35, pp. 601–617.
  • Fine, K. (2001): “The Question of Realism”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 1, pp. 1-30
  • Fine, K. (2005): “Tense and Reality”, in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Fine, K. (2009): “The Question of Ontology”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press.
  • Fine, K. (2012): “Guide to Ground”, in F. Correia & B. Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Forrest, P. (2005): “General Facts, Physical Necessity and the Metaphysics of Time”, in: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. 2, Dean Zimmerman, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Frege, G. (1984): “Thoughts”, in: Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 351-372.
  • Geach, Peter (1972): “Some Problems About Time”, reprinted in: Geach, Logic Matters, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 302-318.
  • Griffiths, D. J. (1987): Introduction to Elementary Particles. Wiley, John & Sons, Inc
  • Grünbaum, A. (1967): Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.
  • Hawthorne, J. (2006): “Three-Dimensionalism”, in Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hinckfuss, I. (1975): The Existence of Space and Time, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.
  • Ismael, J. & Schaffer, J. (manuscript): “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground”.
  • Kim, J. (1990): “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept”, Metaphilosophy 21, pp. 1-27.
  • Ladyman, J., Ross, D., with Spurrett, D. and Collier, J. (2007): Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Le Poidevin, R. (1991): Change, Cause, and Contradiction, London: Macmillan.
  • Leuenberger, St. (2006): Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism, PhD dissertation, Department of Philosophy, Princeton, New Jersey.
  • Lewis, D. (1986): On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Lowe, E. J. (1998): The Possibility of Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Lucas, J. R. (1989): The Future, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Ludlow, P. (1999): Semantics, Tense, and Time, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
  • Markosian, N. (2004): “A Defense of Presentism”, in: Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 47-82
  • Maudlin, T. (2002), “Thoroughly muddled McTaggart or how to abuse gauge freedom to generate metaphysical monstrosities”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2.
  • McCall, St. (1994): A Model of the Universe, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.
  • McKenzie, K. (2014): “Priority and particle physics: ontic structural realism as a priority thesis”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65, pp. 353-380.
  • McTaggart, J. M. E. (1927): The Nature of Existence: Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mellor, D. H. (1981): Real Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mellor, D. H. (1998): Real Time II, London: Routledge.
  • Merricks, T. (1999): “Persistence, Parts, and Presentism”, Noûs 33, pp. 421-438.
  • Meyer, U. (2013): The Nature of Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Miller, K. (2005): “The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism”, Erkenntnis, 62, pp. 91-117.
  • Nagel, E. (1961): The Structure of Science. Problems in the Theory of Scientific Explanation, Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Ney, A. (forthcoming): “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence: A Defense of Wave Function Realism”, Synthese.
  • Prior, A. N. (1970): “The Notion of the Present’, Studium Generale 23, pp. 245–48.
  • Prior, A. N. (2003): “Changes in Events and Changes in Things’, in Papers on Time and Tense, New Edition, P. Hasle, P. Ohrstrom, T. Braüner, and J. Copeland, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7–19.
  • Quine, W. V. O. (1960): Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
  • Rickles, D. (2006): “Time and structure in canonical gravity,” in D. Rickles, S. French, and J. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Rosen, G. (2010): “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction”, in B. Hale & A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Russell, B. (1938): Principles of Mathematics, New York: W. W. Norton.
  • Saunders, S. (2002): “How Relativity Contradicts Presentism”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Suppl. 50: 277-292
  • Saunders, S. (2006): “Are Quantum Particles Objects?”, Analysis 66:1, pp. 52-66.
  • Savitt, St. (2000): “There’s No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)”, Philosophy of Science 67 (Proceedings), S663-S574.
  • Schaffer, J. (2003): “Is there a fundamental level?”, Nous 37:3, pp. 498-517.
  • Sider, T. (2001): Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Sider, T. (2006): “Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology”, Mind 115(457), pp. 75-97.
  • Sider, T. (2009): “Ontological Realism”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press.
  • Sider, T. (2011): Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Smart, J. J. C. (1963): Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  • Smart, J. J. C. (1987): “Time and Becoming”, reprinted in: Smart, Essays Metaphysical and Moral, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 78-90.
  • Smith, Qu. (1993): Language and Time, New York: Oxford University Press
  • Stalnaker, R. C. (1996): “Varieties of Supervenience”, Philosophical Perspectives 10, pp. 221-41.
  • Tooley, M. (1997): Time, Tense, and Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • van Iwagen, P. & Zimmerman, D. (1998): Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Wolff. J. (2012): “Do objects depend on structures?”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63, pp. 607-25.
  • Zimmerman, D. (1996): “Persistence and Presentism”, Philosophical Papers 25, pp. 115-126. Zimmerman, D. (1997): “Chisholm and the Essences of Events”, in: Lewis Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Peru, Illinois: Open Court, pp. 73-100.
  • Zimmerman, D. (1998): “Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism”, in: van Inwagen and Zimmerman (1998), pp. 206-219.
  • Zimmerman, D. (2005): “The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and “Taking Tense Seriously””, Dialectica 59, 403-59. Zimmerman, D., ed. (2004): Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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